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Abstract
This paper examines the consequences of capital and labor subsidies for employment,
capital formation and other macroeconomic variables within an OLG small open
economy model of wealth accumulation. Two cases,  the neoclassical-equilibrium
one and the modern-equilibrium one, have been analyzed. We discover that the
employment effects of the subsidies studied differ significatively, while whether the
subsidy hike is financed by an increase of payroll taxation or a decrease of
employment subsidization is immaterial for the qualitative effects on the
macroeconomic system. In the neoclassical-equilibrium theory, a capital subsidy
causes a temporary increase in hours worked which vanishes in the new long-run,
while an increase in labor subsidy has no aggregative effects on the macroeconomic
equilibrium. The key finding of the modern-equilibrium case is the existence of a
negative relationship between capital formation and employment. Capital subsidies
boost investment and aggravate unemployment, while labor subsidies stimulate
employment and may depress capital accumulation.
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21. Introduction
The persistence of high structural unemployment rates in many industrial economies
has been the source of increasing attention and concern among public opinion, scholars and
policy-makers during the last years. Hence the identification and adoption of proper
therapies to cut unemployment are widely felt to be  a necessity. At the same time, there is
also a widespread concern about the poor investment performance of many western
countries.
Policy measures to reduce unemployment that focus on the labor market are
sometime supposed to have positive effects on capital accumulation; policies of this type are
the reduction of taxes on labor or the introduction of labor subsidies. See Tullio (1987),
Begg-Portes (1993), Drèze-Malinvaud (1994), and Daveri-Tabellini (1997).
Other scholars suggest that rather than adopt measures that impact only/mainly on the
labor market it would be better to implement policies to enhance capital formation, and thus
raise labor productivity, which they presume would increase employment. See, for example,
Drèze-Bean (1990), Rowthorn (1995), and Snower (1997).  A typical action of this sort is
the introduction of  subsidies on capital or investment as means to stimulate capital
accumulation. Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987, chapter 9), for example, discover in a numerical
intertemporal equilibrium model with finite-lived Samuelson-Diamond agents that
investment incentives in a closed economy increase labor temporarily though leaving it
unchanged in the long-run. Sen-Turnovsky (1990) show that in a small open economy model
with a representative infinite-lived household the introduction of a permanent investment tax
credit though initially reducing employment, leads to higher employment in the steady-state
equilibrium. The common feature of studies on capital subsidies is that they consider a
neoclassical labor market, where positive equilibrium unemployment is absent. The
consequences of investment-promoting policies on equilibrium unemployment have received
very little specific attention within a proper theoretical framework.
The purpose of this paper is to compare the consequences for employment and capital
formation of  balanced-budget capital and labor subsidies in an OLG model of wealth
accumulation and exogenous growth in a small open economy. Two cases are considered for
the labor market: the neoclassical-equilibrium theory, where changes in labor determined by
the shock depend on variation in hours worked and not in the unemployment rate which is
absent,  and the modern-equilibrium theory, characterized by the existence of  a positive
3structural rate of unemployment due to efficiency wage considerations of the shirking type.
Particular attention is devoted to problems of financing the policy shifts that can neutralize
the expansionary effect of inputs stimuli when there is simultaneously a compensatory
adjustment of distortionary taxes/subsidies that hinge on the labor market.
We discover that in the neoclassical analysis capital subsidies spur capital formation,
but exerts only temporary positive effects on manhours supplied; labor subsidy is neutral for
the macroeconomic equilibrium, both in the short and long-run.
The key finding under a generalized real-wage rigidity is the existence of a negative
relationship between capital formation and employment. It appears that factor incentives
increase the subsidized factor, but may diminish the non-subsidized factor. Therefore capital
subsidies boost investment and can aggravate unemployment, while labor subsidies
stimulate employment and may depress capital accumulation. The financing regime of the
policy shocks plays no qualitative role for the macroeconomic equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the neoclassical model and
analyzes the long-run and comparative dynamics effects of  capital and labor subsidies hikes.
Section 3 presents the modern-equilibrium model and investigates the macroeconomic
implications of balanced-budget factors incentives. Section 4 concludes.
2. The neoclassical-equilibrium case
2.1 The model
Consider a nonmonetary small open economy that produces a single tradable good,
which is perfectly substitutable with the foreign-produced good. Domestic production is
obtained by using capital and labor. There are only two assets in the economy: real capital
and net foreign assets. The economy is populated by three sectors: finite-lived consumers,
competitive firms and the government. Time is continuous and agents are endowed with
perfect foresight.
The behavior of consumers is derived by adopting the OLG approach of Blanchard
(1985) with no intergenerational bequest motive and an endogenous labor-leisure choice, as
in Kanaginis-Phelps (1994) and Phelps (1994, chapter 16). All consumers are identical and
face uncertainty on the duration of their lives, since a constant probability of death θ  is
assumed. In every instant of time a large new cohort, whose size is normalized to one, is
4born. The population, composed of cohorts of different ages, is constant, as the birth rate is
assumed to equal the death rate.
Assuming that individual utility is logarithmic in consumption of the good, c, and
leisure, l l−  (where l  is the time endownment and l is the labor supply), at each instant t a
consumer born at time s t≤  solves the following problem
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where w=nonhuman wealth; rh=real interest rate faced by households; vh=hourly real wage;
and ρ =rate of time preference (exogenous).
The optimal conditions for the individual problem (1)-(3) are
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where h s t( , ) represents consumer’s  human wealth, given by
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Aggregating over all the cohorts and omitting the time index, the demand side of the model
can be expressed as
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where capital letters denote aggregate variables of the corresponding individual variables.
5From system (4), the Blanchard-Yaari  dynamic equation for aggregate consumption can be
easily derived
WCrC h )()( ρθθρ +−−=?                      (4a’)
Individual nonhuman wealth consists of real capital and the stock of net foreign assets. In
aggregate terms, we have
W K F≡ +
where K is physical capital stock and F is the stock of net foreign assets.
The production side of the economy is populated by many identical firms operating
in a competitive environment in the output and factor markets. Domestic output, Z,  is
produced by using capital and labor as inputs. The production function  has positive, but
diminishing, marginal physical products of inputs,  and is linearly homogeneous in its
arguments
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 where g(k) is the output per manhour and k K
L
≡ is the capital-manhour ratio. For
simplicity, we assume that capital stock does not depreciate and capital accumulation does
not involve adjustment costs.
The first order conditions for maximum profit entail
g k r f' ( ) = (6a)
g k kg k v f( ) ' ( )− = (6b)
where rf represents the cost of capital and vf is the hourly labor cost, both after taxes and
subsidies. Factor prices faced by firms are defined as
r rf h= + −( )1 τ K Ks (7a)
v vf h= + −( )1 τ L Ls (7b)
τ K  and τ L  are ad valorem tax rates on capital and labor respectively and sK and sL are the
corresponding quantity subsidy rates.
The government keeps the budget balanced. Therefore its instantaneous budget
constraint is
τ τ ωL K L Ks sv r k kh h+ = + +           (8)
where ω  represents the fixed per hours government purchases. Our analysis will consider
the macroeconomic effects of exogenous changes in either sK or sL  financed through a
6compensatory accomodation of Lτ  and shifts in the subsidy composition, i.e. an increase in
sK accompanied by a reduction in sL.1
The current account is given by the the trade balance, equal to the excess of
production over absorption, plus the interest income earned on foreign bond holdings
? ( , ) ?F K L C K L r Fh= − − − +G ω (9)
As foreign assets are perfectly tradable at world level, the interest rate available to
households, rh, is equal to the given world interest rate, r* ,
r rh = * (10)
The full model of the economy is obtained combining the optimality conditions for
consumers, firms and the equations of accumulation. The basic structure of the economy can
be expressed as:
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where Wy  is nonwage income of households, given by income from nonhuman wealth,
)(* FKr + , plus the actuarial dividend on wealth, )( FK +θ . The endogenous variables are:
                                                
1 There is no point in exploring the effects of an increase in the capital subsidy coupled with an increase in the
tax rate on domestic capital,  τ K ,  since the one would undo the other.
7k, vh, L, C, H, Wy , K, F and, depending on the mode of financing the exogenous sK or  sL
shock, Lτ  or sL.2
In order to analyze the dynamic properties of  model (11), linearize equations (11a),
(11b) and (11d) around the long-run equilibrium, and solve for C; we obtain the following
implicit semi-reduced form3
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Therefore substituting equation (12) into the equation of motion of nonhuman wealth for C
and using (11d) yields
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By linearizing the above equation around the steady-state equilibrium and substituting out C
from the Blanchard-Yaari  Euler equation through (12), the core dynamics of the model is
described by the autonomous system
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where tildes denote long-run values.
The basic features of the dynamics for L and yW can be easily grasped by using the
phase diagram associated with system (13), represented in Fig. 1. The locus labelled
0=L? describes the combinations of labor and income from nonhuman wealth at which
hours worked (as well as consumption)  remain constant or, put in another way, the
combinations at which the capital market is in equilibrium. It is downward sloping in the (yW,
L) diagram with slope 
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hLW ? . If L is above (below) the
0=L? locus, manhours are increasing (decreasing) as shown by the vertical arrows of motion
in Fig.1. The schedule labelled 0=Wy? shows points at which the cash-flow from nonhuman
wealth is constant (hence saving vanishes). It is negatively-sloped, being its slope
                                                
2 Notice that equation (11b) has been obtained using relationships (6b) and  (7b) and bringing in public budget
balance and the world interest rate. The balance of payments (9) is redundant by the Walras’s law.
3 Other fiscal policy parameters, irrelevant for our purposes, have been omitted from equation (12).
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W above the 0=Wy? schedule, cash-flow from wealth
increases as indicated by the horizontal arrows in Fig. 1. The reverse is true for yW
below 0=Wy?  locus.
Since the determinant of the coefficients’ matrix in (13) is unambiguously negative,4
the long run equilibrium is saddle-point stable, as L (hence C) is a forward-looking variable,
– i.e. L(0) is free– and yW a predetermined one – i.e. yW(0)= Wy0  as W(0)=W0 . Therefore the
0=L? schedule is steeper than the 0=Wy?  locus.
The equation of the saddle-path SS is
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where η1<0 denotes the stable eigenvalue of the matrix of the coefficients in (13). Equation
(14) represents the unique path that converges to the long-run equilibrium. The saddle-path
SS has a slope that lies in between the slopes of the 0=L?  and 0=Wy?  loci.
INSERT FIG. 1
2.2  Comparative statics and dynamics
The analysis studies the following policy shifts: an increase in sK financed through
higher τ L , an increase in sL under τ L  financing, and finally a change in the subsidies mix in
favor of sK.
i) increase in sK under τ L financing
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9Consider the long-run, when all the dynamic variables remain constant through time.
The capital subsidies hike results in an increase in the capital-labor ratio –namely
dk
d g
~
"sK
= − >
1 0 – since it reduces the after-tax and subsidy cost of capital for firms, rf , and
the marginal product of capital is diminishing in capital intensity.5
The implications of the shock on manhours can be analyzed employing the labor
supply and capital market equilibrium schedules, as in Hoon-Phelps (1996). The stock of
human wealth 
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and (4a) yields the following labor-supply function
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Equation (15) gives the steady-state labor supply of finite-lived consumers in terms of the
ratio of wage to cash-flow from wealth. According to equation (15) a reduction in the wage-
non-wage-income ratio brings about a diminution of manhours worked because it increases
leisure. This equation is depicted in Figure 2 and represented by the LS schedule. It is
positively sloped and not affected by subsidies and taxes.
Furthermore, using  the long-run Blanchard-Yaari  “modified golden rule” together
with the consumption function (4a) and the expression for ~H , we obtain the relation
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5 There are no crowding out effects on capital intensity stemming from the compensatory change in the payroll
tax as equation (11a) represents a reduced form for k~ .
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This equation gives for any level of manhours the corresponding W
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capital market equilibrium.6 This relationship, downward-sloping in the (
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since 0* >−> ρθ r , is represented by the BY schedule in Figure 2. The BY curve is not
affected by fiscal variables. The intersection between the two schedules, LS  and BY,
determines the long-run equilibrium values of labor and wage-to-income-from-wealth ratio.
INSERT FIG. 2
Since both equations (15) and (16) are independent of the capital subsidy and the payroll tax
rate, any change in the capital incentive under the current financing regime leaves hours
worked and the wage-nonwage-income ratio unchanged. However, the stimulus to capital
boosts gross domestic product, because domestic capital is increased with the increase in
capital intensity; in the special case *' rg = , which implies that the initial sK  and Lτ  were
exactly offsetting, there is no effect on gross national product and national income; in the
case *' rg > , there is a positive effect on those variables as a result of the improved
allocation of national wealth. As W
h
y
Lv
~
~
 remains unchanged after the shock, hourly wage and
income from wealth therefore change in the same proportion when sK changes. And since
Wy
C
~
~
 is also invariant (from equation (11e)), consumption also changes in equal proportion
to hv~ .
It is crucial for exploring what the effects of sK on the most of the macroeconomic
variables are to detect the forces exerted on vh. The net effect, given by
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h~ ( )
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−τ ,  is ambiguous, as it depends on whether the capital’s before-tax
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equation asserts that the rate of return on wealth must equal the rate of return on consumption, given by the
discount rate plus a premium proportional to the ratio of income from wealth to income from labor.
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marginal product (g’) is above or below the world interest rate (r* ) or equivalently whether
τ Kr * >< sK. Households’wage increases (diminishes) if taxes on capital are relatively higher
(lower) than subsidies, i.e. τ Kr * >(<) sK. If, for example, τ K =0, dv
d
h~
sK
≤ 0 depending on
whether sK is initially equal to or greater than zero. With a positive capital tax rate, the
capital subsidy raises the wage rate when, for example, the capital subsidy is introduced ex
novo. Both cases are plausible. We shall assume, in order to draw some definitive
conclusions on the effect of the capital incentive, that τ Kr * > sK, namely dv
d
h~
sK
> 0 .7 In this
circumstance, the pay rate hv~ , income from wealth, consumption, and nonhuman wealth all
increase unambiguously. (Hence fv~  is also raised by the capital subsidy.) In addition, since
the current account must be balanced and the trade balance may either deteriorate or improve
as hv~  rises, the stock of net foreign assets may be either reduced or increased:
]~~
)(
)s(~[
"~
1
s
~
*
K*K
K Lvr
ry
gvd
Fd hW
h −+
−
−=
θ
τ .
Consider now the comparative dynamics of the model. The analysis of the short-run
adjustment studies only a permanent unanticipated fiscal disturbance. As a rise in sK results
in a long-run increase of the hourly wage, consumption and income from wealth, the
unexpected permanent shock shifts the saddle-path upward to S’S’,8 leading to a short-run
increase of labor (despite the long-run invariance), which overshoots its long-run
equilibrium value (see Figure 1). The equilibrium moves suddenly from point E0 to point E’0
on the new saddle-path. Since leisure diminishes less than the household wage is increased,
an initial jump of consumption occurs as well. The capital stock also jumps up in response to
the jump in capital intensity and to the increase in hours worked, provided we suppose for
simplicity that physical capital is instantaneously and costlessly mobile across borders.
After the shock has taken place, the system, placed on the new stable arm S’S’,
converges monotonically to the long-run equilibrium with a reduction in labor (necessary to
restore the initial equilibrium value) and an incipient accumulation of wealth, which
increases the cash-flow from wealth.
                                                
7 This assumption is also retained below.
8  It is assumed for simplicity that the slope of the saddle-path is unaffected by the exogenous shock.
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When the capital stimulus brings about a long-run drop in household wage,
consumption and income from wealth, i.e. τ Kr * < sK, the economic system follows an
opposite adjustment process, driven by an impact reduction of manhours and consumption.
In this case, it is worth observing that labor increases along the convergence toward the new
long-run equilibrium.
ii) increase in sL financed through higher τ L
A rise in the labor subsidy exerts no long-run effects on the economy as capital
intensity is pinned down by the given cost of capital, rf, which is not changed by this type of
shock, and the labor costs remain constant as the higher sL is completely offset by the
increase in τ L , leaving vf unaffected. All other variables stay unchanged. Therefore as the
transitional dynamics is expectationally driven, no short-run effects of the disturbance occur,
since agents correctly foresee that there will be no future changes in the economy.
iii) increase in sK under sL financing
This shock generates the same qualitative results of case i) both for the short-run
adjustment and the steady-state equilibrium.9
It is worth noticing that the consequences of  capital subsidies are independent of the
way of financing, because the compensatory changes of either the labor subsidy or the
payroll tax rate do not feed back into other equations of the model, as they only affect the
government budget constraint in isolation (which gives residually the solution for sL orτ L
respectively).
3. The modern-equilibrium case
                                                
9 The endogenous adjustment of sL required to support a given increase of sK is
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. If taxation of physical capital is relatively high compared to capital
subsidy, as assumed, the employment subsidy could increase (instead of diminish) as a result of the higher
capital subsidy, because the revenue effect of capital taxation  could be quite robust.
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3.1 The model
The neoclassical model gives no insight regarding the consequences of fiscal
incentives for capital formation or labor use on unemployed workers, since it does not
provide an explanation of equilibrium unemployment. Changes in the labor input are only
due to variations of hours worked and wages adjust to equate labor supply and demand. In
order to investigate the implications of subsidies on the natural rate of  unemployment and
its time path, we use the incentive or efficiency wage theory, based on the assumption of the
shirking behavior of workers begun by Calvo (1979) and Solow (1979). The employees’
effort is imperfectly monitored by firms and requires some costs in order to be observed; it is
then optimal for firms to set wages above the competitive level to raise the cost of being
fired for workers, this stimulating their effort and reducing firms’ costs of monitoring.
The model below is a one-sector version of the (two-sector) model in Phelps (1994,
chapter 9), in which the role of wealth and asset prices are at center-stage.
The production function is
)(),( ikgNNKGZ iiiiii εε == 0",0' <> gg (17)
where G satisfies the usual neoclassical properties of regularity and is constant returns to
scale, ε i  represents the effort or efficiency  of a single worker in the i-th firm, Ni is the
number of workers employed by the i-th firm and ki ≡ K
N
i
i iε
 represents the efficiency-
adjusted capital-labor ratio.
We postulate that  the effort of employees at individual firm level depends on the
worker wage earned within the firm, on expected wage and nonwage income, according to
the following relationship
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where z is the expected income obtainable elsewhere if the worker is fired, vi
h  gives the
wage per employee paid in the i-th firm and yW  is the average nonwage income of workers,
taken as ratio to the worker population (whose size is unity).
In this context, firms are wage setters. Assuming that the optimal behavior of all
firms is identical, so that we can omit the superscript i,  the first order conditions for the
maximum profit are
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By following Calvo (1979) and Salop (1979), we can set z Nvh=   –where N also
represents the employment rate, since the population has been normalized to one.
Combining equations (19b) and (19c) and using the Calvo-Salop indicator for z, we
obtain the modified Solow condition
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According to condition (19d) the sum of the partial elasticities of the effort function, taken in
absolute value, must be greater than one at the optimum. The hypothesis sL>0, assuring that
the sum of the partial elasticities is greater than one, is crucial in order to have the effects of
subsidies and taxes on the incentive-wage equation and therefore on the whole
macroeconomic equilibrium.
The government budget constraint is given by
τ τ ε ε ωL K L Ks sv rh + = +* ?k k +
where ?ω  represents the fixed public spending-employment ratio.
The rest of the model is the same as in the neoclassical-equilibrium case. The
substantial difference from the previous model is that now L is replaced with N.
The investigation of the short-run adjustment requires the discussion of the dynamic
properties of the model. As shown in the Appendix,  the modern-equilibrium model exhibits
saddle-point stability under any financing regime considered.
3.2 Steady-state and transitional dynamics
i) increase in sK financed through an increase in Lτ
As for the analysis developed under the neoclassical-equilibrium case, the Blanchard-
Yaari capital market equilibrium condition along with the incentive-wage equation (which is
for the modern-equilibrium model the equivalent of the labor-supply schedule) can be used
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to study the comparative statics effects of sK on employment and wage-to-cash-flow-from-
wealth ratio.
From the arbitrage condition between returns on wealth and consumption, the
following relation is obtained
1
*
* ~
)(
)(
~
~
−
−
−+
= N
r
r
y
v
W
h
ρ
ρθ    (20)
This function is depicted in fig. 3 e labelled BY.
The wage-setting condition must be expressed in a convenient way. By substituting
equation (19b) for ( )1+ τ L vh  into equation (19c), the optimal condition for wage can be
expressed as
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From the previous equation, by using the relationship ~ ( )k k= sK  (which is implied by the
reduced form (19a), with 0
"
1' >−=
g
k ), the following functional relation is obtained
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Expressions for the partial derivatives of this function are reported in the Appendix.
The incentive-wage equation (21a) states that W
h
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~
 positively depend upon ~N and sK, and
negatively on sL. Notice that if sL =0, 02 =Ψ ; in this case the incentive-wage equation
becomes independent of fiscal variables, since the Solow elasticity condition implies that the
sum of the partial elasticities must be equal to one. Equation (21a) can be purposefully
employed for the steady-state analysis as sL is fixed.
Consider the steady-state effects of the capital subsidy using the ( N
y
v
W
h ~,~
~
) diagram of
fig. 3. The IW schedule represents equation (21a). If sL  is positive, the capital-promoting
policy shifts the incentive-wage relation upwards and, for an unchanged BY schedule, leads
to lower employment and higher ratio of  wage to income from wealth. This result is to be
attributed to the fact that the greater capital intensity resulting from the higher capital
subsidy induces firms to pay higher wages, compared to nonwage income, in order to elicit
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the optimal effort of employees. In turn, the increase of unemployment and W
h
y
v
~
~
 raise the
effort of each worker (ε ). It follows from our results and the elasticity condition in (19d)
that labor input expressed in efficiency units ( ~)ε N  rises on balanced as sL>0. The increase
of ε  pulls up both the steady-state wage rate (hence also steady-state wealth) and, on
balance, pulls up output (hence capital stock) in spite of the induced decrease of
employment. It can be shown that the wage-bill and consumption are likewise increased. It is
not clear whether the stock of net foreign assets increases or not, since the trade balance can
either improve or worsen.10 In a world with no employment subsidy, i.e. sL=0, an increase in
sK would leave employment,  nonhuman wealth-wage ratio and the effort of each worker
unaffected.
INSERT FIG. 3
Consider now the dynamic adjustment for N and Wy  following an unexpected
permanent increase in the capital subsidy when sL>0. Fig. 4 describes the short-run behavior
of the economy. Here the NE schedule represents the equilibrium rate of employment as a
function of income from wealth.11 This is a static equation that is negatively sloped and
shifted downward on the left by higher capital subsidies. The 0=Wy? schedule exhibits the
points at which the cash-flow from wealth is constant; it can be either positively or
negatively sloped and is shifted downward by a rise in sK.12 We shall consider the case of the
0=Wy?  schedule positively sloped.13
                                                
10 The principal long-run multipliers are given in the Appendix.
11 See the Appendix for mathematical details. This shedule can be derived  by using equation (19b) along with
the government budget and the incentive-wage equation (21a).
12 The 0=Wy? schedule is constructed by using the private budget constraint together with the equilibrium
wage (as a function of income from wealth) and the saddle-path equation that describes the behavior of C in
terms of  Wy . See equation (24b) in the Appendix. When this schedule is negatively sloped, its slope, taken in
absolute value, is lower than the slope of the NE line by the saddle-path stability condition. In such a case the
downward shift of the 0=Wy? line induced by the higher Ks  is bigger than the vertical shift  of the NE
schedule.
13 The same type of behavior is observed when the 0=Wy?  schedule is downward sloping.
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After the unexpected permanent change in sK, a sudden downward adjustment of
employment from E0 to E0’ occurs. Now in contrast to the neoclassical-equilibrium model,
the employment drop undershoots the long-run contraction. The decrease in employment by
dampening the rate of shirking in turn drives up tha take-home wage received by employees;
this can either overshoot or undershoot its final equilibrium value. If sL>0, employment
expressed in efficiency units is actually increased and capital stock increases proportionally
more, since capital intensity defined in efficiency terms is increased on impact by the
subsidy. Consumption jumps upwards.
INSERT FIG. 4
Soon after the impact adjustment of the economy, an accumulation of wealth begins,
accompanied by further reduction of employment and increase of consumption, which
monotonically converge toward the long-run equilibrium.
ii) increase in sL under Lτ financing
The long-run effects of an increase in sL can be analyzed using equations (20) and
(21a). Since sK is now constant, the higher labor subsidy shifts the IW schedule downward
on the right at IW” in Fig. 3. Therefore, we have higher employment and a lower wage-to-
income-from-wealth ratio. There are two cases. If sL is initially equal to zero, then the rise of
employment comes at the expense of an inversely equiproportionate decrease of the wage, as
a result of the increased shirking. Employment in efficiency units is unchanged on balance
(as ε  has a global elasticity with respect to N~  in (20) just equal to one) and since the
efficiency-adjusted capital intensity remain constant (as the cost of capital is unchanged) the
capital stock is unchanged. If initial sL is positive, then employment in efficiency units is
actually decreased on balance (as the global of elasticity of ε  with respect to N~ is now
greater than one), and the capital stock is decreased as well. Wage, nonwage income,
consumption, output and the stock of net foreign assets are all reduced unambiguously.14
                                                
14 Since the increase in Lτ  to finance the increase in sL must reduce take-home wage by the amount of the
increase in the subsidy, any change in the take-home wage is matched by an equal change in the cost of  labor
per employee.
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The system shows a saddle-path behavior, characterized by the instantaneous jump of
employment, wage and consumption and lagged adjustment of the predetermined variables.
It is not difficult to show that no perverse-shootings occur.
iii) increase in sK financed through a reduction in sL
In this case it is convenient for the aim of simplifying the analysis to find an
expression for the incentive-wage that is independent of sL. By substituting the government
budget constraint into (19b) and using (19a), the wage-setting condition becomes
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This equation may be solved for ~N , using the reduced-form ~ ( )k k= sK , to yield the
following relationship
),s,~
~
(~ LK τh
W
v
yN Φ= ,01 <Φ  ,02 <Φ  ,03 >Φ              (21b)
where the partial derivatives are given in the Appendix. Equation (21b) represents another
characterization of  the incentive-wage relationship.15 By inverting equation (21b), we see
that W
h
y
v
~
~
 depends positively on employment and capital subsidy, and negatively upon the ad
valorem payroll tax rate.16 Since τ L  is fixed, equation (21b) together with the capital market
equilibrium condition describes the steady-state consequences of the capital subsidy in the
quasi-Marshallian diagram of Fig. 3.
The long-run effects and the short-run dynamics of the unanticipated increase in the
capital subsidy under the current financing regime are qualitatively  the same as those seen
under Lτ  financing. Therefore, what was said before remains valid when describing them.
However it is not difficult to show that now the steady-state multipliers taken in absolute
                                                
15 Equations (21a) and (21b) characterize the incentive-wage with different emphasis on fiscal subsidy/tax rates.
The main difference is that equation (21a) is based on the optimal conditions for employment and wage, while
equation (21b) includes the government budget constraint and the optimal condition for capital and wage.
16Note that in principle the effect of sK on the wage-to-income-from-wealth ratio is unclear, namely the sign of
Φ2  is ambiguous, because the rise in capital subsidy could result in an increase in public revenues due to
capital taxation that overwhelms the corresponding increase in public expenditures for investment subsidy.
Therefore an increase in employment subsidy rather than a decrease could happen, if the revenue effect from
capital taxation is strong enough. If we impose the mild restriction that prevents this perverse effect from
occurring, i.e. 0"~)s*)(1( KKL <+−+ gr kττ , then Φ2  will be unambiguously negative.
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value are bigger than those in case i), as the channels of trasmission of the shock are
reinforced by the reduction of the employment subsidy.
4. Concluding remarks
The paper has examined the consequences of capital and labor subsidies for
employment, capital formation and other macroeconomic variables within a nonmonetary
small open economy model of wealth accumulation with new generations. Two cases,  the
neoclassical-equilibrium one and the modern-equilibrium one, have been analyzed. We
discovered that the employment effects of the subsidies studied differ significatively from
the case analyzed and the type of subsidy, while the financing procedure is immaterial for
the qualitative effects on the macroeconomic system.
In the neoclassical-equilibrium theory, a capital subsidy at first causes an increase in
hours worked which is eroded and vanishes along the transition to the new long-run
equilibrium, provided that taxation of capital was and remains higher than capital subsidies.
In this case national income, consumption, output and capital stock are all increased by the
shock. An increase in labor subsidy has no effects on the macroeconomic equilibrium.
Within the modern-equilibrium theory, a capital subsidy, financed by either an
increase of  Lτ  or a decrease of sL  is contractionary for employment if  sL>0, despite the
positive effect on capital intensity and hence the capital stock, and is neutral for employment
if sL=0. The reason for the negative consequences of the capital stimulus on employment
comes entirely from the incentive-wage offered by firms, which is increased by the shock. In
the short-run the sudden drop in employment is followed by a further reduction along the
transient path toward the equilibrium. The capital subsidy exerts positive effects on output,
capital stock and consumption. An increase in the employment subsidy raises employment,
and in so doing reduces the wage. If sL is initially zero, a small subsidy has no first-order
effect on national income, consumption, output and capital stock. If sL is initially positive,
the subsidy reduces national income, consumption and capital.
It is not new to find that, when labor finances its own subsidy, the gain of
employment achieved by the subsidy lowers the wage; proposals for low-wage subsidies
envision financing by all wage earners, so low wages may be pulled up alongside
employment. What is new here is that employment subsidies may reduce output and capital
stock, while capital subsidies may reduce employment.
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Appendix
I. Partial derivatives of the incentive-wage functions
I.A Equation (21a)
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I.B Equation (21b)
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II. Analysis of stability
II.A  Case of  τ L  financing
By expressing the wage per employee as  { }ωε ˆ)s()]s([ *KK −−= rgv h kk  and using
the effort function (18) with the Salop-Calvo indicator, we obtain the real wage demand
relation
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Equation (21a) and the real wage demand can be solved together for N and vh in terms of the
state variable Wy , and the fiscal parameters as
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Equations (22a) and (22b) give the equilibrium unemployment and wage as function of
income from wealth and fiscal parameters, respectively.
By substituting equations (22) into the equation of motion of income from wealth, i.e. the
consumers budget constraint, and linearizing around the long-run equilibrium, we get:
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This equation, together with the law of motion of  aggregate consumption, describes the
basic dynamics of the economy.  Saddle-path stability requires that the determinant of the
core dynamic system satisfies the following inequality
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The short-run behavior of the model can be inferred from the saddle-path equation in
the Wy - C plane, given by
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where µ1<0 is the unique stable eigenvalue of the 2x2 autonomous system of differential
equations in C and Wy .
The linearized version of equation (22b) along with the private budget constraint and
equation (23) describes the dynamic behavior of employment and nonwage income
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Equations (24a) and (24b) give the NE and 0=Wy?  schedules of Fig. 4 respectively. The
slope of 0=Wy? schedule can be either positive or negative.
The impact effect of capital subsidy on employment is
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The short-run effect of sL on employment is
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II.B Case of sL financing
The dynamic properties of the model in this case can be analyzed similarly to case
II.A. Now the employment and wage semi-reduced forms can be derived using the real wage
demand relation along with equation (21b); the partial derivatives of these equations
correspond to those of  (22a) and (22b) once Ψi  is replaced withΦ i , for i=1,2,3.
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III. Long-run multipliers
III.A Increase in sK  under Lτ  financing
The basic multipliers are
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III.B Increase in sL under Lτ financing
The basic multipliers are
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III.C Increase in sK under sL financing
The basic multipliers are given by those of section III.A when 2Ψ <0 is replaced with
2Φ <0.
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